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I. Introduction 
[T]he term ‗stem cells‘ is inexact.  And it‘s really more akin to the term 
‗seeds.‘  We appreciate that not all seeds are alike.  An apple seed makes 
apple trees, an orange seed makes orange seeds.  And when we talk 
about apples and oranges, we don‘t get them confused.  Well, the 
distinctions between seeds are essential to the biologist, just as the 
distinctions among different stem cell types are essential.1 
Excerpt from Senate testimony of George Q. Daley, MD, PhD. 
Just as slight variations between different sources of stem cells are crucial to 
understanding the real policy debate over when life begins under the law, slight 
permutations in the federal regulations and guidelines for stem cell research can have 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Legal Reasoning, Research, & Writing; J.D., Boston College Law School; 
D.Sc. and M.P.H. Harvard School of Public Health. 
** Attorney; J.D., Boston College Law School. 
1 Can Congress Help Fulfill the Promise of Stem Cell Research?: Joint Hearing Before the Comm. of Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and 
Related Agencies of the Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) (statement of George Q. 
Daley, M.D., Ph.D.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg32808/pdf/ 
CHRG-110shrg32808.pdf [hereinafter Daley Testimony]. 
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serious ramifications for advancing the science of stem cell research and therapeutic 
applications.  As human embryonic stem cell (―ESC‖) research has garnered widespread 
press coverage and generated enormous public controversy for over a decade,2 scientists 
and physicians have been finding generous amounts of less controversial, adult stem 
cells (―ASCs‖) in an increasingly wide array of human tissue.  These discoveries promise 
new and urgently needed therapies for patients but also pose novel challenges for 
regulators.  This is especially so here, where many ASC therapies are emerging from the 
offices of practicing physicians instead of the laboratories of university or commercial 
research scientists. 
All stem cells are ―undifferentiated‖ or unspecialized; beyond that, different 
categories of stem cells are characterized by their source.  Embryonic stem cells are 
derived from the blastocyst stage of an embryo, which means the embryonic stem cell is 
developed prior to the implantation in the uterine wall.3  ESCs are ―pluripotent‖ because 
potentially, a single embryonic stem cell can be coaxed into differentiating into any kind 
of cell found in the developed organism.4  Therapeutic applications include directing 
ESCs to become specific kinds of cells for the purpose of understanding a particular 
disease or medication, replacing or repairing a certain kind of tissue, or creating an 
entirely new organ for transplantation.5  Adult stem cells qualify as stem cells because 
they too are undifferentiated, but they are adult in that they are found among cells that 
have already differentiated into a particular kind of tissue.6  ASCs are ―multipotent‖ in 
that they are able to differentiate, but they are more limited in their ability to develop 
into cell types and tissues that differ from the original tissue from which they were 
derived.7  ASCs function primarily to restore dying cells and repair damaged tissue.8  
Unlike the more controversial ESC therapies, many ASC treatments rely on autologous 
cells, i.e., stem cells which are harvested from an individual patient and later re-injected 
                                                          
2 Christine Vestal, Stem Cell Research at the Crossroads of Religion and Politics, PEW FORUM (Jul. 17, 
2008), http://pewforum.org/Science-and-Bioethics/Stem-Cell-Research-at-the-Crossroads-of- 
Religion-and-Politics.aspx (last visited May 11, 2011) (discussing the history of the ESC debate in 
the United States). 
3 NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Information-The Embryonic Stem Cell, (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scireport/chapter2.asp (last visited May 11, 2011). 
4 Li-Fang Chu & Thomas P. Zwaka, Human Pluripotent Cells: The Biology of Pluripotency, HUMAN 
STEM CELL TECH. & BIOLOGY: A RESEARCH GUIDE & LAB. MANUAL 313, 313 (2011). 
5 See Richard Mollard, Embyonic Stem Cells, INT‘L SOC‘Y FOR STEM CELL RES., available at 
http://www.isscr.org/public/ES_cells.pdf. 
6 NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Basics: What Are Adult Stem Cells? (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics4.asp (last visited May 11, 2011). 
7 See Maria Borowski & Gary S. Stein, Pluripotent Stem Cells: Biology & Applications, HUMAN STEM 
CELL TECH. & BIOLOGY: A RESEARCH GUIDE & LAB. MANUAL 3, 5 (2011). 
8 See NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Basics: What Are Adult Stem Cells?, supra note 6. 
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into that same patient to restore deteriorated tissue.9  ASCs are believed to have vast 
reparative potential due to their undifferentiated state and ability to self-renew; further, 
ASCs have recently been located in more organs and tissues than previously thought 
possible, including the brain, heart, bone marrow, skeletal muscle, skin, teeth, and—a 
surprisingly rich source of ASCs—human adipose tissue, or fat.10  To date, ASCs have 
been used to accelerate wound repair,11 restore degenerated discs or joints in animal 
studies,12 and may soon assist in reversing degenerative diseases like age-related macular 
degeneration and Parkinson‘s disease.13 
Developing ASC therapies have been so promising that the technology is no 
longer confined to the clinical laboratories of academic institutions or pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.  Practicing physicians and surgeons are increasingly taking the lead in 
treating patients with ASC therapies, particularly with the patient‘s own autologous 
ASCs.14  In theory, this may seem like a brave new world, but in practice, extracting and 
re-injecting a patient‘s own cells is not that different from other reparative or surgical 
procedures.  For instance, coronary artery bypass graft surgery typically removes the 
saphenous vein from the patient‘s leg with the purpose of using that vein to re-route 
coronary circulation to bypass an occluded artery.15  Spinal surgery often uses bone from 
a patient‘s pelvis or rib to fuse vertebrae.16  Further, withdrawing adult stem cells from 
adipose tissue is much less invasive than either of these or many other procedures 
                                                          
9 See NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Basics: What Are the Potential Uses of Adult Stem Cells and the 
Obstacles that Must Be Overcome Before These Potential Uses Will Be Realized? (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics6.asp (last visited May 11, 2011). 
10 See id. 
11 See, e.g., Mario Cherubino, et al., Adipose-Derived Stem Cells for Wound Healing Applications, 66 
ANNALS OF PLASTIC SURGERY 210, 210-15 (2011). 
12 See, e.g., Timothy Ganey et al., Intervertebral Disc Repair Using Adipose Tissue-Derived Stem and 
Regenerative Cells: Experiments in a Canine Model, 34 SPINE 2297 (2009) (reporting effective lumbar 
disc regeneration from autologous stem and regenerative cells in study consisting of twelve dogs). 
13 See, e.g., Michael Day, Stem Cell Research: A New Age Dawns in Healthcare, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 19, 
2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/8072484/Stem-cell-research-a-new-age-dawns-in- 
healthcare.html (last visited May 11, 2011). 
14 E.g., DANA-FARBER CANCER INST., Dana-Farber Stem Cell Transplantation (2011), 
http://www.dana-farber.org/Adult-Care/Treatment-and-Support/Treatment-Centers-and-
Clinical-Services/Stem-Cell-Transplantation-Program.aspx (last visited May 11, 2011) (discussing 
Dana-Farber/Brigham and Women‘s Cancer Center‘s ASC transplantation program). 
15 NAT‘L HEART LUNG & BLOOD INST., What Is Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting?, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/cabg/cabg_whatis.html (last visited May 11, 
2011). 
16 Peter F. Ullrich, Autograft: The Patient‟s Own Bone, SPINE-HEALTH (Nov. 25, 2009), 
http://www.spine-health.com/treatment/spinal-fusion/autograft-patients-own-bone (last visited 
May 11, 2011). 
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relying on the patient‘s own tissue.  The fact that such procedures have recently become 
a matter of routine is largely attributable to the innovations of physicians and surgeons 
involved in the practice of medicine (who, for the sake of this discussion, along with 
other health care providers will be collectively referred to as ―physicians‖).  Obviously, 
autologous ASC therapies have yet to reach such widespread acceptance since 
understanding where ASCs exist and how they can be used is relatively new.17  
Nevertheless, as they have for so many other therapies, doctors have made significant 
strides in understanding where to find ASCs and developing therapeutic treatments, 
especially for autologous ASCs. 18 
In recent years, the federal Food and Drug Administration (―FDA‖) has quietly 
asserted its regulatory authority over physicians who have bridged the gap between adult 
stem cell research and treatment.  It has done so despite the fact that it lacks jurisdiction 
over the practice of medicine, an area that is traditionally within the scope of state law.19  
Prior to 2005, the FDA did not assert regulatory authority over autologous ASC 
therapies primarily because the patient would receive her own cells back.20  This all 
changed in 2005, however, when a subtle modification in a single regulation, 
implemented without public notice and comment rulemaking, laid the groundwork for a 
major expansion of FDA oversight of regenerative, ASC therapies using both 
autologous and allogenic cells. 21 
In an untitled letter dated July 25, 2008, the FDA first asserted its regulatory 
authority over the ASC therapies advertised and performed by Regenerative Sciences, a 
Colorado-based medical practice and its physician owners.22  The FDA specifically 
                                                          
17 See NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH, Stem Cell Information-Executive Summary (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/scireport/execSum.asp (last visited May 11, 2011) (highlighting 
that adult stem cells have been extensively studied but are still difficult to identify, isolate, and 
purify). 
18 See Jason Blevins, Stem-Cell Therapy Feels Food and Drug Administration‟s Pinch, DENV. POST, (Aug. 
19, 2010), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14871656?source=email (last visited May 11, 
2011). 
19 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2006); see also Dina Gould Halme & David A. Kessler, FDA Regulations of 
Stem-Cell-Based Therapies, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1730, 1730-31 (2006) (describing FDA‘s 
authority to regulate ―tissue based products‖). 
20 See 21 C.F.R. § 1270.1(c) (2006) (stating that ―regulations for this chapter do not apply to 
autologous human tissue); see also FDA WEBSITE-TISSUE & TISSUE PRODUCT QUESTIONS & 
ANSWERS, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/Questionsabout 
Tissues/ucm101559.htm (last visited May 11, 2011) (stating that all tissues recovered prior to 
May 25, 2005, are regulated under 21 C.F.R. Part 1270). 
21 See 21 C.F.R. § 1271; see also infra notes 134, 206 and accompanying text. 
22 Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Dir. of Compliance and Biologics Quality, U.S. Food & Drug 
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targeted their ―Regenexx Procedure,‖ which was promoted as an alternative to invasive 
orthopedic surgery.23  The technique involves isolating a patient‘s own stem cells, 
culturing them in the lab using growth factors drawn from the patient‘s own blood, and 
re-injecting the multiplied autologous ASCs back into the patient‘s body.24  Based on its 
review of the Regenerative Sciences website, the FDA determined that this procedure 
constituted a ―drug‖ under section 201(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(―FDCA‖) and a ―biological product‖ under section 351(i) of the Public Health Service 
Act (―PHSA‖), thereby subjecting Regenerative Sciences to the same requirements that 
govern commercial manufacturers of mass produced drugs.25 
In response, Regenerative Sciences filed two lawsuits challenging the FDA‘s 
jurisdiction to regulate the use of a patient‘s own adult stem cells when performed by a 
medical practice (as opposed to a commercial manufacturer).26  It first filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Colorado in February 2009, alleging that 
the FDA had exceeded its regulatory authority under the FDCA and the PHSA.27  After 
this was dismissed for lack of ripeness,28 Regenerative Sciences filed a second suit 
against the FDA in June 2010, this time in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.29  It sought to enjoin the FDA to either take formal agency action 
against it or abandon its enforcement activities.30  In August 2010, the FDA, acting 
                                                          
Admin., to Christopher J. Centeno, M.D., Med. Dir., Regenerative Sci., Inc. (July 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/UntitledLetters/ucm091991.htm. 
23 See id.  The FDA letter quotes the Regenexx site as characterizing the procedure as restorative 
and as a less disruptive alternative to surgery.  See id. 
24 REGENEXX, Procedure Explained, http://www.regenexx.com/the-regenexx-procedure-explained 
(last visited May 11, 2011). 
25 Id. (noting how the FDA determined the procedure to constitute a drug).  See generally Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(g), 21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1) (2006); Public Health Service Act § 351(i), 
42 U.S.C. 262 (2006). 
26 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Against United States Food & Drug Admin., 
Regenerative Sci. Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin, No. 1:09-CV-00411 (D. Colo. Feb. 
26, 2009); Complaint Against United States Food & Drug Admin., Regenerative Sci. Inc. v. 
United States Food & Drug Admin, No. 1:10-CV-01055 (D. D.C. filed June 22, 2010). 
27 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Against United States Food & Drug Admin., 
Regenerative Sci. Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin, No. 1:09-CV-00411 (D. Colo. Feb. 
26, 2009). 
28 See Order of Dismissal, Regenerative Sci. Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin, No. 1:09-
CV-00411, at *9 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2009). 
29 See Complaint Against United States Food & Drug Admin., Regenerative Sci. Inc. v. United 
States Food & Drug Admin, No. 1:10-CV-01055 (D. D.C. filed June 22, 2010). 
30 See Complaint Against United States Food & Drug Admin., Regenerative Sci. Inc. v. United 
States Food & Drug Admin, No. 1:10-CV-01055, at *13 (D. D.C. filed June 22, 2010). 
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through the United States Department of Justice (―DOJ‖) filed its own suit against 
Regenerative Sciences in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.31  Alleging 
that the Regenexx Procedure is subject to regulation under the FDCA and PHSA, the 
FDA is currently attempting permanently to enjoin Regenerative Sciences from treating 
patients with autologous ASC therapies.32  Regenerative Sciences agreed to stay its June 
2010 lawsuit against the FDA pending the resolution of the FDA‘s claims.33 
This article discusses why the FDA‘s decision to assert jurisdiction over 
physicians producing autologous ASC therapies sets a dangerous precedent.  It begins 
with an historical overview of the FDCA and the PHSA and explains the FDA‘s 
definition of ―drug‖ and ―biologic product‖ in interpreting and applying these laws.  
Next, it examines the FDA‘s lawsuit against Regenerative Sciences, with the goal of 
evaluating whether the FDA can, as well as whether it should, exert such regulatory 
authority over independent medical practices. 
This article concludes that given the degree of judicial deference accorded to an 
agency‘s rule-making discretion to interpret and apply its authorizing statutes, the FDA 
is likely to prevail in its effort to subject physicians involved in direct patient care to a 
regulatory scheme designed for mass drug manufacturers.  Nevertheless, as explained 
herein, the FDA should abandon its current stance since it impedes medical advances 
and therefore undermines the agency‘s overall purpose of advancing public health.  This 
article recommends that the FDA either revert to its pre-2005 regulation, which 
acknowledged that autologous and allogenic ASCs carry different risk potentials and 
treated them accordingly, or follow the European Commission‘s lead in crafting a 
flexible regulatory regime to accommodate the interests of physicians and commercial 
drug manufacturers while promoting both safety and innovation. 
 
                                                          
31 See Complaint Against Regenerative Sci. Inc., United States v. Regenerative Sci. Inc., No. 1:10-
CV-01327 (D. D.C. filed Aug. 8, 2010). 
32 See Complaint Against Regenerative Sci. Inc., United States v. Regenerative Sci. Inc., No. 1:10-
CV-01327, at *6, *8 (D. D.C. filed Aug. 8, 2010). 
33 See Jennifer B. Davis, Rulings Issued in Two Unrelated Lawsuits Challenging FDA‟s Authority Under 
Section 361 of the PHS Act, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 12, 2010, 2:07 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2010/04/rulings-issued-in-two-
unrelated-lawsuits-challenging-fdas-authority-under-section-361-of-the-phs-act.html (last visited 
May 11, 2011) (discussing the dismissal of Regenerative Science‘s case in the U.S. District Court 
for the District Court of Colorado). 
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II. Discussion 
A. The Evolution of FDA Regulation of “Biologics” and “Drugs” and 
its Impact on the Practice of Medicine 
That the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to protect the general public 
from unsafe medical products has been well established for over a century.34  Moreover, 
the United States Supreme Court has consistently found federal food and drug statutes, 
such as the Biologics Act, the Pure Food and Drug Act, and the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, all discussed below, to be a valid exercise of that power.35  As the agency 
charged with interpreting and enforcing such laws,36 the FDA can expect substantial 
judicial deference toward its actions via Chevron analysis.37  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has invalidated, albeit infrequently, FDA actions for exceeding the agency‘s 
statutory power to define drugs or biologics subject to FDA oversight38 and has also 
curtailed its preemption of state law in certain instances, primarily because of conflict, as 
opposed to complete preemption.39  The tension between deference to agency discretion 
                                                          
34 See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57 (1911) (characterizing the 1906 Pure 
Food and Drug as an appropriate means to execute the power the Constitution conferred upon 
Congress). 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948) (finding implicitly that the FDCA is 
a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power).  ―For the Act as a whole was designed primarily to 
protect consumers from dangerous products.‖  Id. 
36 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 482 n.5 (1996).  These statutes delegate 
enforcement authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, which in turn, delegates it 
to the FDA. 
37 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (citing Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).  The Court explained that, as required by 
Chevron, when Congress ―has directly spoken to the precise question at issue . . . [the reviewing 
court] must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."  Id.  Otherwise, a 
court ―must respect the agency's construction of the statute so long as it is permissible.‖  Id. 
38 See id. at 156 (FDA lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as drugs and drug delivery 
devices). 
39 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (finding no conflict preemption by FDA drug 
labeling regulations, as found in 21 C.F.R. section 314.70, of certain state tort claims for 
inadequate warnings in the absence of congressional intent); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503 (holding 
similarly as Wyeth for regulations of Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA, 21 USC § 301 et 
seq.).  Courts should engage a ―starting presumption‖ against federal preemption of state law, 
especially in areas rationally left to state control.  N.Y. Conf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-655 (1995).  ―Complete‖ or ―field‖ preemption occurs 
when Congress intends to legislate in an area to the exclusion of any state laws, even compatible 
ones; whereas, ―conflict‖ preemption permits federal and state laws to co-exist unless the state 
law conflicts or interferes with the operation of the federal statute.  See generally Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing the basic legal principles of preemption by 
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and concern for preserving the operation of state law in areas traditionally subject to 
state control, such as the practice of medicine, permeates FDA jurisprudence and will 
undoubtedly continue to do so in the Regenexx litigation.  For a better understanding of 
how this will play out, an overview of the evolution and impact of the Biologics Act, the 
Pure Food and Drug Act, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is essential. 
1. The Biologics Act 
In 1902, after thirteen children died from receiving a contaminated vaccine, 
Congress enacted the Biologics Act40 to allow federal regulation of ―biologics,‖ such as a 
―virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxins . . . or analogous product‖ that were intended 
for the ―prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.‖41  
The goal of this legislation was to maintain the quality of biologics by focusing on 
manufacturing activities concerning production, labeling, and interstate movement of 
biologics,42 while continuing to abstain from regulating the biologic products 
themselves.43  Manufacturers now had to obtain a federal ―establishment license‖ to 
produce and market a biologic,44 which tended to favor large manufacturers since 
smaller firms often lacked the resources to implement stringent quality control measures 
and comport with other licensing prerequisites.45 
                                                          
the federal government). 
40 See Philip D. Noguchi, From Jim to Gene and Beyond: An Odyssey of Biologics Regulation, 51 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 367, 367-68 (1996). 
41 Biologics Act of 1902, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1); see also Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-7003, 124 Stat. 119 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
262(i)) (defining a biological product as ―a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, 
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein . . . or analogous product . . . 
applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings‖).  The 
2009 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act was enacted for the purpose of providing 
an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on (i.e., generic) biologics.  Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 §§ 7001-7003.   Under this legislation, the FDA 
regulates this approval process.  Id. 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1)(A); Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics Manufacturing: Questioning 
the Premise, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 217-18 (1994). 
43 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 262. 
44 See Al Ghignone, The Product License Application (PLA), in BIOLOGICS DEVELOPMENT: A 
REGULATORY OVERVIEW 146 (Mark Mathieu ed., 1993). 
45 See JONATHAN LIEBENAU, MEDICAL SCIENCE & MEDICAL INDUSTRY: THE FORMATION OF 
THE AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 51, 79 (1987). 
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2. The Pure Food and Drug Act 
The eventual overlap of biologics and drug regulation began in 1906, when 
Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act (―PFDA‖) to quell public fears about 
food contamination following the publication of Upton Sinclair‘s harrowing account of 
the unsanitary meat industry in The Jungle.46  While the PFDA primarily regulated foods, 
it also provided limited oversight of drugs that were ―adulterated‖ (by differing from 
applicable standards regarding their make-up) or ―misbranded‖ (insofar as they deviated 
from the brand name and ingredients contained on the package label).47 
3. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
In 1938, Congress enacted the PFDA‘s successor: the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (―FDCA‖), which serves as the primary source of the FDA‘s regulatory 
power over drugs.48  It authorizes the FDA to regulate ―[t]he introduction or delivery for 
introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is 
adulterated or misbranded,‖ with the aim of protecting the public health.49  While the 
FDCA significantly expanded federal regulatory authority, its legislative history shows 
that Congress never intended the FDA to regulate ―the practice of medicine.‖50  Senator 
                                                          
46 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 
1938); Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The Fiction of a Safe Meat Supply, 33 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 446-47 (discussing the impact of the The Jungle on the congressional 
agenda); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA HISTORY - PART I,  http://www.fda.gov/About 
FDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm (last visited May 11, 2011). 
47 See Pure Food and Drug Act § 2, 34 Stat. at 768.  The PFDA defined a drug as adulterated if it 
differed from either the USP ―standard of strength, quality, or purity‖ or the product's own 
―[p]rofessed standard under which it was sold.‖  Id. § 7, 34 Stat. at 769-70.  A drug was 
misbranded if it was an imitation sold under the name of another product, if the original contents 
were removed in whole or part and replaced, or if the article neglected to state the quantity of 
alcohol, morphine, cocaine, heroin, etc.  See id. § 8, 34 Stat. at 770. 
48 See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2010) (listing actions prohibited under 
FDCA). 
49 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). 
50 See FOOD DRUG LAW INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW & REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK 
AT FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT 423, 424 (David G. Adams & 
Richard M. Cooper eds., 1997); see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 
350 (2001) (―[T]he FDA's mission [is to] . . . regulate . . . without directly interfering with the 
practice of medicine‖); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed 
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76 (1998) (―[The] FDA 
never has had authority to regulate the practice of medicine; physicians may use legally marketed 
drugs or devices in any way that they believe, in their professional judgment, will best serve their 
patients‖). 
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Royal Copeland, the driving force behind the legislation and a physician himself, was 
determined to preclude FDA interference with the medical profession, explaining:51 
[T]he bill is not intended as a medical practices act and will not interfere 
with the practice of the healing art by chiropractors and others in the 
States where they are licensed by law to engage in such practice.  It is 
not intended to permit the sale in interstate commerce or otherwise in 
Federal jurisdiction of adulterated or misbranded drugs or devices 
under the guise of the practice of a healing art.  It is likewise not 
intended to permit the false advertising of drugs and devices under 
such guise.52 
Accordingly, to ensure that the FDA had no role in overseeing the practice of 
medicine, one bill sought to limit the definition of ―drug‖ by omitting any ―medicine 
prepared and dispensed by a physician in the course of his professional practice.‖53  
However, the bill was rejected as superfluous since there was ―nothing in the [FDCA] 
which would interfere at all with the ordinary legal practice of medicine.‖54 
Despite Congress‘ clear intent to avoid FDA interference with the practice of 
medicine, a last-minute modification of the 1938 Act, which created restrictive new drug 
provisions, provided the basis for indirect agency interference.55  The modified Act 
banned the shipment in interstate commerce of drugs that were not generally regarded 
as safe unless a New Drug Application (―NDA‖) had been filed with the Secretary of 
Agriculture.56  The NDA was required to describe the drug‘s components and 
composition, the process by which it was manufactured, and the intended uses of the 
drug, as well as establish that the drug was safe for its intended use.57  Although the 
                                                          
51 See Peter Barton Hutt, Regulation of the Practice of Medicine Under the Pure Food and Drug Laws, 33 Q. 
BULL. ASS'N OF FOOD & DRUG OFF. 1, 7 (1969). 
52 FOOD DRUG LAW INST., supra note 50, at 424. 
53 See Hutt, supra note 51, at 8. 
54 See Hutt, supra note 51, at 8. 
55 See Hutt, supra note 51, at 9.  These drug provisions were a direct response to the public health 
crisis that arose from the Elixir of Sulfanilamide incident, an improperly prepared medicine that 
was widely distributed and subsequently led to the deaths of one-hundred people.  See Sharon B. 
Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in the 
United States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 604 (2009). 
56 See Jacobs, supra note 55, at 604. 
57 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938) (current version codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)).  These modifications also authorized the Secretary to suspend an existing 
NDA for just cause and exempt from the NDA requirements drugs intended for investigational 
purposes, the safety of which was to be tested by qualified experts.  See id. § 505(h)-(i), 52 Stat. 
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FDA‘s power to determine which drugs can enter the market could have potentially 
circumscribed a physician‘s discretion in prescribing medications,58 then section 505(b) 
of the FDCA was neither interpreted nor enforced to that end from 1938 to 1962.59 
4.  The FDCA‟s 1962 Drug Amendments 
When Congress amended the FDCA in 1962 to require new drugs to be proven 
both safe and effective for their intended uses prior to being shipped in interstate 
commerce, it again displayed no intent to regulate the practice of medicine.60  Instead of 
addressing the medical profession‘s involvement in disseminating information about 
drugs, the 1962 Amendments charge pharmaceutical manufacturers with preventing 
inaccurate drug labeling and advertising, avoiding misuse of drugs, and thwarting 
ethically questionable drug experimentation.61 
This reflected fundamental principles of federalism and the longstanding 
allocation of medical drug and device oversight to the federal government,62 while 
leaving intact the states‘ historical authority to define and regulate the practice of 
medicine to protect the health and safety of their citizens.63 However, Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce, which 
extends to ―commerce among the states,‖ as well as to intrastate activities, ―which so 
affect interstate commerce . . . as to make regulation of them appropriate.‖64  
Consequently, state oversight of the medical profession does not preclude concurrent 
and even preemptive federal regulation if the practice of medicine is interpreted as 
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.65  As one court explained: 
To the extent that the plaintiffs‘ claim of unconstitutional interference 
                                                          
1053. 
58 See id. ch. 675, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)) (describing 
application requirements for a new drug). 
59 See Hutt, supra note 51, at 9. 
60 See Hutt, supra note 51, at 9. 
61 Hutt, supra note 51, at 9-10. 
62 See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925). 
63 See, e.g., Nat'l Pharmacies, Inc., v. De Melecio, 51 F. Supp. 2d 45, 54-55 (D. P.R. 1999) (citing 
cases with similar holdings). 
64 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (―The 
Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian tribes‖). 
65 See, e.g., United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 267-72 (3d Cir. 2002); Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 
F. Supp. 580, 593 (D. Me. 1995). 
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with the right to practice medicine is founded on a notion of federalism 
which reserves all rights over such regulation to the states, it is without 
merit.  It is undisputed that the practice of medicine is subject to the 
exercise of state police power where such regulation furthers a 
legitimate state interest.  But that assumption does not imply an 
absence of federal jurisdiction over the same area, where the federal 
regulation constitutes a reasonable exercise of a power vested in 
Congress under the Constitution . . . . The fact that the practice of 
medicine is an area traditionally regulated by the states does not 
invalidate those provisions of the [FDCA] which may at times impinge 
on some aspect of a doctor‘s practice.66  
To that end, the FDA has not hesitated to regulate physician activities that the 
FDA has deemed to have had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, such as 
advertising to both local and out-of-state patients, which is easily accomplished through 
the internet and occurs particularly where patients have an incentive to cross state lines 
to obtain an innovative procedure that has not yet become widely available.67  More 
typically, however, the FDA targets physician entrepreneurial activities that exceed the 
mere exercise of professional judgment in selecting a course of treatment for patients.  
In this context, courts have upheld FDA enforcement actions that subject these 
physicians to the same regulations as large corporations.68  Therefore, the broad power 
accorded to the FDA under the Commerce Clause is unlikely to prevent the agency 
                                                          
66 Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v.  Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1187-88 (D. Del. 1980).  See 
generally Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305 (1969) (finding a snack bar that served food to interstate 
travelers subject to regulation under Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (finding a hotel that served interstate travelers subject to 
regulation under Commerce Clause); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 681-93 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(finding provision for reproductive health services substantially affects interstate commerce). 
67 See, e.g., Robert J. Davis, Surgery Money-Back Guarantees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2002, at D6 
(providing coverage of a urologist that has advertised his money-back guarantee nationally 
through use of billboards); Randy Kennedy, Memo to Doctors: Cross the River, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
1999, at B1 (reporting that residents of New Jersey often seek medical care in Philadelphia or 
New York City). 
68 See, e.g., United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1304-05, 1313-14 
(5th Cir. 1987); Cowan v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (denying a 
terminally ill patient‘s attempt to obtain access to an unapproved AIDS drug containing goat 
neutralizing antibodies since the FDCA does not ―permit doctors to test unapproved drugs‖); 
Retkwa v. Orentreich, 579 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578-81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Cabiroy v. Scipione, 767 
A.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a doctor who had injected unapproved liquid silicone 
into a patient was guilty of negligence per se). 
C_BOOK 3 CHIRBA 5/20/2011  2:20 PM 
2011 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW 245 
from regulating the activities of most health care providers.69 
5.  Defining a “Drug” Under the FDCA 
Given the FDA‘s perceived Commerce Clause power to affect the practice of 
medicine, perhaps its most significant impact on physician practice has been the 
FDCA‘s and FDA‘s definition of what constitutes a ―drug.‖  Section 321(g) of the 
FDCA defines a drug as an article ―intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease‖70 or that is ―intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body . . . .‖71  An article‘s ―intended use‖ denotes ―the objective intent of 
the persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs,‖ and can be determined by 
those persons‘ representations, including ―labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or 
written statements by such persons or their representatives.‖72  Thus, a major point of 
contention in the FDA and Regenerative Sciences litigation is whether a patient‘s own 
cells, i.e., ASCs, qualify as a ―drug‖ when a treating physician harvests and re-injects 
those cells in a therapeutic setting. 
Courts typically give substantial deference to an agency‘s interpretation of its 
enabling statute as long as the court is confident that agency rulemaking accords with 
statutory text and congressional intent.73  This has certainly been true regarding the 
FDA‘s construction of the FDCA and its interpretation of what constitutes a ―drug.‖74  
To determine whether an article is a ―drug‖ under the FDCA, a court will look to both 
the FDA‘s interpretation of its own statute and, as required by the statute itself, the 
product‘s intended use.75  In making this determination, reviewing courts do not 
consider an article‘s inherent properties.76  For example, melaleuca oil, a homeopathic 
                                                          
69 See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 593. 
70 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2009). 
71 Id. § 321(g)(1)(C). 
72 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (1999). 
73 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988) (explaining that ―the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress‖). 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 394 U.S. 784, 799-800 (1969) 
(upholding FDA‘s interpretation of the term ―drug‖ to include antibiotic sensitivity disks 
manufactured by the defendants). 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72, (explaining FDCA defines an ―article‖ as a ―drug‖ if it 
is ―intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease‖ or is 
―intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals‖). 
76 See Meza v. S. Cal. Physicians Ins. Exch., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (―a 
substance's actual or intended use or administration may determine whether it is a drug . . . .‖); 
Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Circ. 2004) (allowing the FDA to use labeling to 
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remedy for warts, was deemed a drug when a doctor used it to treat or cure a medical 
condition.77  The court emphasized that ―the federal decisions construing the Act‘s 
definition of ‗drug‘ consistently hold that it must be read as widely as possible.‖78  Thus, 
―[the Act‘s] scope should not be restricted to products commonly called drugs.‖79  
Consequently, by recommending the melaleuca oil to the patient as a treatment for her 
wart, the physician effectively conveyed his intent that the oil be used for a medical 
purpose without regard to the product‘s inherent properties; and it was this intended use 
that rendered it an unapproved drug under the FDCA.80 
In its 1969 decision of United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . ,81 the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FDA‘s determination that antibiotic sensitivity discs, 
which are used for selecting appropriate antibiotics for a particular patient, were drugs 
and not devices.82  This classification subjected the discs to the more rigid regulation of 
drugs than devices that existed at that time, despite Justice Douglas‘ insistence that this 
directly contradicted the FDCA‘s express terms.83  The majority stated that it ―must give 
effect to congressional intent in view of the well-accepted principle that remedial 
legislation such as the [FDCA] is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the 
Act‘s overriding purpose to protect the public health.‖84 
This broad interpretation of the FDCA, coupled with the judiciary‘s traditional 
deference to agency action, makes the normally uphill battle of regulatory challenges 
especially steep when taking on the FDA.85  Consequently, overturning the FDA‘s 
characterization of a product as a ―drug‖ is particularly difficult.  However, it can be 
                                                          
infer intent in order to determine whether a marketed product is a drug); Culver v. Nelson, 54 
N.W.2d 7, 10 (Minn. 1952) (defining drugs as ―substances and preparations intended for external 
and internal use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animal‖). 
77 Meza, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (quoting United States v. An Article Consisting of 36 Boxes, 284 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Del. 
1968), aff‟d, 415 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.1969)). 
80 Meza, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.  But see Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 170 (2000) (noting that intent may also be shown by circumstances 
surrounding the article‘s distribution). 
81 394 U.S. 784 (1969). 
82 Id. at 800. 
83 Id. at 800-01. 
84 Id. at 798. 
85 See id. (discussing how the FDCA‘s definitions were meant to be construed broadly to better 
protect the public).  See also generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(judicial deference given to administrative agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes). 
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done, as demonstrated by FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,86 in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the FDA‘s effort to regulate tobacco products as medical drugs 
and devices.87  Even here, though, the Court declined to supplant the FDA‘s definition 
of a drug with its own; rather, it premised its decision on Congress‘ overarching intent to 
exempt tobacco products from FDA oversight altogether.88 
Once the FDA defines an article as a drug, the manufacturer must satisfy 
onerous pre-marketing administrative and clinical requirements, including submitting a 
NDA89 or an Investigational New Drug Application (―IND‖).90  Further, the agency is 
statutorily obligated to ensure that investigational drug studies have been critiqued and 
approved by an Institutional Review Board for the purpose of protecting human 
subjects.91  This system obviously requires considerable time and resources to bring a 
new drug to the market, but it was designed for major pharmaceutical companies 
capable of meeting these challenges.92  Not surprisingly, the sizeable costs of bringing a 
new drug to the market, including the high risk of never gaining FDA approval, have 
given large manufacturers dominion over new drug development.93 
The potentially confusing overlap and interplay of drug regulation under the 
                                                          
86 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
87 Id. at 161. 
88 Id. at 126 (finding the FDA‘s assertion of authority was inconsistent and therefore invalidated 
by ―the intent that Congress has expressed in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the 
tobacco-specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA‖). 
89 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)-(b) (2002), 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2002) (requiring a NDA to provide 
extensive information on its active ingredient(s), the chemical means of delivering this ingredient, 
the manufacturing and packaging procedures, suggested labeling, and clinical trial data 
establishing the drug to be both safe and effective). 
90 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i).  Under 21 U.S.C. section 355(i), a FDA-approved IND permits a 
manufacturer to distribute a drug in limited quantities for the sole purpose of performing studies 
on human subjects.  Id.  The IND application must be supported by detailed information about 
the drug, the planned course of study, the protocols for such studies, the identity and location of 
the investigators overseeing the studies, and the action that it will take to ensure the safety of its 
participating human subjects.  Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.23. 
91 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2002); see Halme & Kessler, supra note 19 (describing the need for stem cell 
therapies to abide by these FDA Guidelines to protect human subjects while researchers study 
efficacy). 
92 FDA Approval of Drugs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Kenneth I. Kaitin, Ph. D., Associate Director, Tufts 
Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts University). 
93 Alastair J.J. Wood, M.D., A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 355 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 618 (2006) (describing the expense and risk associated with new drug approvals 
that make the process prohibitive to all but the biggest companies). 
C_BOOK 3 CHIRBA 5/20/2011  2:20 PM 
248 JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW VOL. VII NO. 2 
FDCA and biologics under the Biologics Act is nothing new.94  In 1944, Congress 
conducted hearings on whether to narrow or reconcile the applicability of either law, but 
in re-codifying the Biologics Act as the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (―PHSA‖), 
Congress opted to maintain a dual yet separate biologics regulatory regime that 
continues today.95  Thus, biologics are licensed under the PHSA after they are proven to 
be ―safe, pure, and potent.‖96  They are also subject to the FDCA, although biologics 
manufacturers are not required to file NDAs in addition to obtaining biologics 
licenses.97  Consequently, with the exception of new drug provisions, applying the 
FDCA‘s dual safety and effectiveness requirements has made the standards for biologics 
―similar, if not identical‖ to drugs, meaning that biologics manufacturers also must 
prove through clinical studies that the biological product is both safe and effective in 
order to obtain FDA approval.98  Moreover, under the FDCA, the term ―drug‖ is 
defined not in terms of its colloquial meaning but as ―a term of art for the purposes of 
the Act, encompassing far more than the strict medical definition of that word.‖99  As a 
result, an article can qualify as both a biologic subject to PHSA licensing criteria and a 
drug subject to FDCA pre-marketing requirements, thereby exposing that product to 
extensive regulatory oversight. 
B. FDA Regulation of Human Cells and Tissues: A Three-Tiered 
Framework 
Scientific developments in the field of cellular medicine achieved real traction in 
the 1990s.  In the FDA‘s view, the products of this innovative research were potentially 
governed by both the FDCA and the Biologics Act; therefore, problems quickly arose in 
subjecting cellular products to the conventional Investigational New Drug or Biologic 
License Application (―BLA‖) regulatory approval mechanisms.100  In dealing with new 
                                                          
94 See Gamerman, supra note 42, at 220 n. 42 (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
Educ. & Labor, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1944)). 
95 Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (July 1, 1944) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262 et seq.); see Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological 
Regulation: Past, Present, and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J., 123, 126-27 (1995). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 262 (a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2010). 
97 See Biologics; Products Subject to License Control, 21 C.F.R. § 310.4(a) (2005). 
98 DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL 
REQUIREMENTS, BIOLOGIC APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 13.02, at 13-4 (Aspen Law & Bus., 6th 
ed. 2004). 
99 United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 394 U.S. 784, 793 (1969). 
100 Robert A. Preti, Bringing Safe and Effective Cell Therapies to the Bedside, 23 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 801, 803 (2005); see also Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government 
Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1996); Philip D. Noguchi, From Jim to 
Gene and Beyond: An Odyssey of Biologics Regulation, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367, 368 (1996) (―Despite 
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experimental treatments, the FDA‘s priority has traditionally been to permit only safe 
and effective cellular therapies to enter the market.101  However, the PHSA‘s biologics 
licensing requirements, as well as the FDCA‘s drug pre-marketing approval requirements 
for regulating comparatively simpler chemical (e.g., small molecules and natural 
products) or biological entities (e.g., monoclonal antibodies or recombinant proteins), 
were ill suited to regulate these emerging cell and tissue products.102  In terms of safety, 
the FDA was especially concerned with preventing transmission of communicable 
pathogens or agents, but also recognized the value of flexible regulation in 
accommodating the public health interest of permitting ongoing development of 
innovative, experimental treatments.103 
Thus, in 1997, the FDA announced its plans to re-work its regulatory approach 
to human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products, and invited public 
comments.104  After several years of publishing various proposals and receiving 
extensive comments, the agency promulgated its human cell and tissue-based products 
(―HCT/P‖) regulations in January 2001, codified in 21 C.F.R. section 1271.105  Section 
1271 created a hierarchy that subjected products with greater risks to more stringent 
oversight than their lower-risk counterparts.106  It did so by categorizing products into 
one of three tiers based on their perceived risk potential.107  At the time, the agency 
stated that ―consolidating the regulation‖ of HCT/Ps in this way would promote 
consistency, efficiency, safety, and ―encourage[ ] the development of new products.‖108 
                                                          
the agency‘s recent approach to unification toward single product therapeutics, cell and gene 
therapies continue to challenge existing statutes and regulations‖). 
101 Preti, supra note 100, at 803. 
102 Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry‟s Unintended Admission That Biotech 
Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 31 (2006) (discussing legal hurdles for generic 
biologics that stem from a regulatory structure ―developed long before the modern biologics 
era‖); see also Preti, supra note 100. 
103 See Mandel, supra note 102, at 31. 
104 A Proposed Approach to the Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 62 Fed. Reg. 
9721 (Mar. 4, 1997). 
105 According to 21 C.F.R. section 1271.1(a), the FDA intended its HCT/P regulations ―to create 
a unified registration and listing system for establishments that manufacture human cells, tissues, 
and cellular and tissue-based products (HCT/P's) and to establish donor-eligibility, current good 
tissue practice, and other procedures to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of 
communicable diseases by HCT/P's.‖  See also Final Rule, Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and 
Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and Listing, 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807 and 
1271.1 (2001). 
106 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2010). 
107 Id. 
108 66  Fed. Reg. 5447-5448 (Jan. 19, 2001). 
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1. Category 1 Products–No Oversight 
The first category of products, comprised of human organs for transplantation, 
whole blood and blood-derived products, and extracted human products such as 
collagen and bone marrow, are not regarded as human cell or tissue-based products, and 
therefore, they are not subject to the 21 C.F.R. section 1271 regulations.109  Products in 
this category must satisfy two criteria during their manufacture: (1) they must not 
undergo more than minimal manipulation, or experience any other alteration of 
biological traits; and (2) their use must be homologous, meaning that the products must 
be used to perform the same basic biological function in the recipient as in the donor.110 
2. Category 2: Section 361 Products–Minimal Oversight 
The second category of HCT/Ps is regulated solely under authority of section 
361 of the PHSA; such ―361 products‖ include human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue 
based products that, in the FDA‘s assessment, pose a slightly higher risk.111  To qualify 
as a 361 product, and thus be subject to minimal oversight, an HCT/P must meet each 
of the following four criteria: 
(1) The HCT/P is minimally manipulated; (2) The HCT/P is intended 
for homologous use only, as reflected by the labeling, advertising, or 
other indications of the manufacturer‘s objective intent; (3) The 
manufacture of the HCT/P does not involve the combination of the 
cells or tissues with another article . . . and (4) Either: (i) The HCT/P 
does not have a systemic effect and is not dependent upon the 
metabolic activity of living cells for its primary function; or (ii) The 
HCT/P has a systemic effect or is dependent upon the metabolic 
activity of living cells for its primary function, and (a) is for autologous 
use; (b) is for allogenic use in a first-degree or second-degree blood 
relative; or (c) is for reproductive use.112 
                                                          
109 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d). 
110 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(c) (defining homologous); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(f) (defining minimal 
manipulation).  Minimal manipulation is defined as: ―(1) For structural tissue, processing that 
does not alter the original relevant characteristics of the tissue relating to the tissue's utility for 
reconstruction, repair, or replacement; and (2) For cells or nonstructural tissues, processing that 
does not alter the relevant biological characteristics of cells or tissues.‖  Id. 
111 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d).  Examples of HCT/P‘s include, but are not limited to: bone, ligament, 
skin, dura mater, and cornea.  Id. 
112 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.10(a)(1) – (4)(ii). 
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Section 361 products, involving ―minimally processed tissues transplanted from 
one person to another for their normal structural functions,‖ are subject to ―infectious 
disease screening and testing and to requirements for good handling procedures‖ in 
order to prevent contamination or disease transmission.113  However, these products are 
not subject to FDCA pre-market review and approval requirements, need not have an 
IND, NDA, or BLA, and need not conform to the current Good Manufacturing 
Practices (―cGMPs‖) requirements that govern commercial manufacturers of medical 
drugs and devices.114 
The FDA has stated that section 361‘s first criterion of minimal manipulation 
encompasses such processes as centrifugation, sterilization by ethylene oxide treatment 
or irradiation, cell separation, lyophilization, and cryopreservation.115  The agency has 
made clear that the second criterion of homologous use will be construed broadly; for 
example, using amniotic membrane in the eye and cartilage in the bladder are non-
homologous uses.116  The FDA has also emphasized that a product‘s homologous use 
depends on how its manufacturer, which may or may not be the practitioner who uses the 
product, intended the product to be used.117  The agency justified the third criterion, that 
the product may not be combined with a drug or device (save for a sterilizing, 
preserving, or storage agent), by explaining that ―[t]he addition of a drug or device to the 
cell or tissue component of [the product] may ordinarily be expected to add a 
therapeutic effect and may also raise safety concerns.‖118  Therefore, adding agents that 
have a therapeutic effect, as well as operating as cryoprotectants, sterilizers, or storage 
agents, will remove the product from section 361 regulation and expose it to stiffer 
controls.119 
The fourth criterion for qualifying for section 361‘s reduced oversight is that a 
product cannot have a systemic effect or depend on the metabolic activity of living cells 
                                                          
113 See generally Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Food & Drug Admin., Establishment 
Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 63 
Fed. Reg. 26744-01, 26745 (proposed May 14, 1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 
and 1271). 
114 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (detailing pre-market approval requirements for 
articles that are deemed to be drugs). 
115 See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration 
and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5449 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 
1271). 
116 Id. at 5458.  The intent was to interpret the term "nonhomologous" narrowly.  Id. 
117 Id. at 5458-59. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
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for its primary function,120 unless the product is intended for: (a) autologous use;121 (b) 
allogenic use in a first- or second-degree blood relative; or (c) reproductive use.122  
Consequently, the cell or tissue product cannot be intended for release to the general 
population. 
3. Category 3: Section 351 Products–Stiff Regulation of Biologic Drugs 
The third and final category classifies products as biologic drugs or medical 
devices under the FDCA and/or section 351 of the PHSA and subjects them to the 
highest level of regulatory scrutiny.123  These products have undergone more than 
minimal manipulation and/or are intended for non-homologous use.  For instance, 
section 351 governs products that have been manipulated through gene transduction or 
tissue culture and are used non-homologously, such as treating incontinence by using 
knee cartilage to supply bladder support.124  In the FDA‘s view, there is no biological 
precedent for such uses and the higher risk of unforeseeable consequences justifies more 
rigorous oversight.125  Accordingly, section 351 products are regarded as pharmaceutical 
products subject to both the FDCA and PHSA that must undergo extensive pre-market 
review procedures, including the procurement of a BLA.126  In addition, entities that 
conduct the recovery, screening, testing, processing, storing, labeling, packaging, or 
distribution of these products are ―manufacturers‖ and are subject to cGMPs 
requirements.127  These entities must also conduct the typically three-phased clinical 
trials required of pharmaceutical companies to verify the safety, purity, potency, efficacy, 
and stability of their products.128 
4. The Impact of the FDA‟s HCT/P Regulatory Hierarchy on the Practice of Medicine 
The FDA implemented the three-tiered HCT/P system because its 
conventional regulatory models for enforcing the FDCA and PHSA made little sense 
                                                          
120 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a)(4) (2010). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.20 (stating that HCT/Ps that do not fall under either 
of the first two tiers are regulated under Section 351 of the PHSA). 
124 See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.20. 
125 See Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration 
and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5449 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 
1271). 
126 42 U.S.C. § 262(a). 
127 21 C.F.R. § 207.3(a)(8) (defining manufacturing). 
128 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (outlining the process for licensure of biological products). 
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when applied to cell and tissue products.  Cell and tissue products are produced and 
used in ways and settings that differ from those of drugs, devices, and standard 
biologics, thereby requiring separate regulatory standards.129  The HCT/P hierarchy is 
laudable in its intent and basic approach, but it often compounds the confusion that it 
was supposed to resolve.130  The Regenerative Sciences litigation brings this into sharp 
contrast by revealing uncertainties regarding: (a) what qualifies as minimal manipulation; 
(b) what qualifies as homologous use; (c) whether autologous and allogenic uses should 
be regulated collectively or uncoupled; and (d) whether physician practices should be 
held to the same ―pre-marketing‖ requirements as commercial manufacturers, especially 
when doing so may impede innovation and interfere with the practice of medicine.131 
The FDA‘s response to these concerns, in terms of the content of its rules, the 
process by which they were enacted, and the manner in which they will be enforced, is at 
the core of the Regenerative Sciences litigation.132  Indeed, before the Regenexx case, 
little attention was paid to a subtle change in how the FDA defines HCT/Ps and, 
therefore, whether a particular cell product will qualify for the first tier of no oversight, 
the second tier of minimal 361 oversight, or the third tier of more burdensome 351 
requirements.  Specifically, after an extensive and active notice and comment period that 
extended from 1997 to 2001, the FDA defined HCT/Ps subject to minimal 361 
requirements as ―any human tissue derived from a human body and intended for 
transplantation into another human . . . .‖133  The use of ―another‖ human signaled that 
allogenic therapies fell within the second tier of 361 coverage, while physicians would be 
free to devise and use autologous cells and tissues without having to comply with either 
section 361 oversight or section 351‘s pre-marketing new drug application and biologic 
licensing application requirements. 
In 2006, however, the agency departed from its extensive use of notice and 
comments in establishing and refining its approach to regulating cell and tissue products 
                                                          
129 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262 and 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19, 2001) (setting forth the regulatory 
framework for HCT/P products), with 21 U.S.C. § 360 and 21 C.F.R. § 207 (presenting the 
regulatory framework for drugs, devices, and non-§ 351 biologics). 
130 See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text (displaying the ambiguities in classifying what 
constitutes a drug); supra notes 94-99 (discussing the legislative history leading to the regulation of 
biologics as a distinct class). 
131 See Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., No. 09-CV-00411-WYD-
BNB, 2010 WL 1258010 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2010); Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. United States Food 
& Drug Admin., No. 1:10-CV-01055-RMC (D.D.C. June 22, 2010). 
132 See supra text pp. 252-54 (outlining FDA‘s regulatory framework) and infra notes 205-207 
(analyzing the case). 
133 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(1) (2001) (emphasis added); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(1) (2005). 
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when it quietly, but substantially, changed the basic definition of HCT/Ps that drives the 
entire three-tiered, risk based framework.  With no notice and no opportunity for public 
comment, and indeed, with no formal announcement beyond its routine, annual 
publication of regulations, the FDA redefined  HCT/Ps by deleting the critical 
descriptor of ―another‖ human and expanding intended uses.  Thus, section 1271.3(d) 
now states that ―[h]uman cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products (HCT/Ps) 
means articles containing or consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for 
implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human recipient.‖134  By shifting 
from ―another‖ to ―a‖ human recipient, this single word change treats autologous and 
allogenic HCT/Ps as carrying comparable risks, contravening the FDA‘s prior stance 
that autologous cells involved ―minimal if any risk‖ at all.135 
Whether this kind of regulatory change can be effectuated without following 
notice and comment procedures is a major point of contention in the Regenexx 
litigation.  At a minimum, acting covertly unfairly disadvantages the very actors, 
practicing surgeons and physicians engaged in the practice of medicine who are most 
likely to deal with autologous therapies; they are also the least likely to have the legal 
resources or prior awareness of the need to comb each year‘s Code of Federal 
Regulations for minor changes.  Compounding this dilemma is the growing irony of the 
three-tiered approach to regulating HCT/Ps.  After all, the agency issued its HCT/P 
framework because regulating cellular products as if they were standard drugs made no 
sense.  In its pursuit of the Regenexx case, though, the agency stubbornly and ironically 
refuses to consider whether regulating physicians under sections 361 and especially 351 
as if they are large, commercial pharmaceutical manufacturers similarly makes no sense. 
C. The FDA Sues Regenerative Sciences to Enjoin an Autologous Adult 
Stem Cell Therapy 
1. Regenerative Sciences Background 
Two orthopedists operating a small medical clinic in Broomfield, Colorado 
formed Regenerative Sciences Inc. in 2006.136  The Regenexx website describes their 
                                                          
134 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d) (emphasis added); see also, 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(1). 
135 See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 29952 (May 25, 2005) (―We have also clarified [section] 1271.90(b)(3), 
that cells and tissues for autologous use do not require the label ‗Advise patient of communicable 
disease risk‘ because the patient's own cells or tissues are being returned, and in this situation, there is minimal, if 
any, risk'") (emphasis added). 
136 See Regenerative Sci., Inc., 2010 WL 1258010, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2010); REDORBIT.COM, 
New Non-Surgical Stem-Cell Procedure Relieve Degenerative Joint Disease (Nov. 8, 2007), 
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―Regenexx Procedure‖ as an alternative to traditional joint and bone surgery.137  The 
procedure begins when a Regenerative Sciences physician extracts bone marrow from 
the back of a patient‘s hip and draws blood from the patient‘s arm.138  The marrow and 
blood samples are transported to Regenerative Sciences‘ laboratory, also located in 
Broomfield, Colorado, where Mesenchymal Stem Cells (―MSCs‖)139 are isolated from 
the bone marrow and multiplied using the natural growth factors in a patient‘s blood.140  
After one to two weeks of multiplying in the lab, a now greater number of MSCs are re-
injected into the patient‘s injured area with the goal of regenerating bone and cartilage 
and ultimately repairing the injury.141 
Regenerative Sciences has published a large safety study indexed in the National 
Library of Medicine that, it claims, demonstrates that the Regenexx Procedure is much 
safer than invasive surgery.142  Moreover, the procedure follows the International 
Cellular Medicine Society‘s (―ICMS‖) autologous cell processing guidelines.143  
Regenerative has also undergone audits by Reglera, an independent consulting firm 
specializing in medical device and tissue regulatory compliance.144 
                                                          
http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/1136294/new_nonsurgical_stemcell_procedure_relieves
_degenerative_joint_disease/ (noting Regenerative Sciences founded in 2006) (last visited May 
11, 2011). 
137 REGENEXX, About the Regenexx Procedure, http://www.regenexx.com (last visited May 11, 
2011). 
138 REGENEXX, Procedure Explained, http://www.regenexx.com/the-regenexx-procedure-
explained/ (last visited May 11, 2011). 
139 See Suzanne Kadereit, Adult Stem Cells, INT‘L SOC‘Y FOR STEM CELL RES. (2005), available at 
http://www.isscr.org/public/Adult_SC.pdf.  Mesenchymal Stem Cells are multi-potent cells that 
can differentiate into a number of cell types, fat cells, cartilage, bone, tendon and ligaments, 
muscles cells, skin cells, and even nerve cells.  Id. 
140 Regenerative Sci., Inc., 2010 WL 1258010, at *1. 
141 Id. (describing the Regenexx Procedure). 
142 STEM CELL PIONEERS, Regenerative Sciences and the FDA–FAQs (Aug. 8, 2010), 
http://www.stemcellpioneers.com/showthread.php?t=3501 (last visited May 11, 2011). 
143 Id.  The International Cellular Medicine Society (―ICMS‖) is a global non-profit organization 
dedicated to enhancing patient safety and peer oversight in adult stem cell research; ICMS 
publishes guidelines and best practices standards for the conduct of adult stem cell medicine; and 
ICMS maintains a ―Treatment Registry‖ of patient reports to track patient outcomes and 
complications.  See generally, INT‘L CELLULAR MED. SOC‘Y, http://www.stemcelldocs.org/ (last 
visited May 11, 2011).  In addition, ICMS, together with Regenerative Medicine Institute (―RMI‖) 
of Tijuana, Mexico, recently launched a detailed accreditation process for clinics that use ASC 
therapies.  See INT‘L CELLULAR MED. SOC‘Y, First Clinic Accreditation Participant (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://cellmedicinesociety.org/home/news/latest/338-first-clinic-accreditation-participant (last 
visited May 11, 2011). 
144 See REGLERA, Reglera Achieves ISO Certifications for Medical Device Production and Quality 
Management System, http://www.reglera.com/biomed/fs_biomed.asp (last visited May 11, 2011) 
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The Regenexx-SD procedure combines extracted cells with ―a super platelet 
mix‖ to obtain a greater yield of stem cells that can be re-injected in patients within a 
shorter timeframe than the two weeks needed when using a patient‘s own growth 
factor.145  In this regard, Regenerative Sciences distinguishes itself from other stem cell 
clinics that simply utilize Platelet Rich Plasmas (―PRP‖).146  Regenerative Sciences has 
also provided background on PRPs, explaining that treatments using these substances 
involve the injection or addition of blood platelets for growth factor delivery.147  
Nevertheless, Regenerative Sciences acknowledges that the overall effectiveness of using 
these plasmas has not been confirmed, concluding that, ―like most things in medicine, 
the jury is still out.‖148 
According to Christopher Centeno, M.D., the Medical Director and Chief 
Executive Officer of Regenerative Sciences, approximately seventy percent of the 
clinic‘s patients ―fly in for treatment,‖ and ―[a]bout half of them are coming in from 
outside the country.‖149  As of January 2011, Regenerative Sciences had treated 
approximately eight hundred individual patients with its Regenexx procedures and had 
performed well over one thousand orthopedic stem cell re-injections.150 
2.  Legal Action 
In July of 2008, the FDA informed Regenerative Sciences that after reviewing 
the Regenexx Procedure website, it determined that the procedure constituted a drug 
under section 201(g) of the FDCA and a biological product under section 351(i) of the 
PHSA.151  The FDA further maintained that the Regenexx MSCs were HCT/Ps, as 
defined by section 1271.3(d) of the HCT/P regulations, but failed to satisfy the section 
                                                          
(providing background on Reglera and its consulting business which specializes in ―medical 
devices and human cellular and tissue products‖). 
145 REGENEXX.COM, Super Platelet Mix and Regenexx-SD (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.regenexx.com/2010/08/super-platelet-mix-and-regenexx-sd (last visited May 11, 
2011). 
146 Id. (―Not satisfied with just adding PRP to isolated bone marrow stem cells, we looked for 
better solutions.  Since nobody had ever compared different growth factor (platelet) mixes with 
human mesenchymal stem cells, we did that in 2009‖). 
147 REGENEXX.COM, Is Platelet Rich Plasma the Same Thing as Stem Cell Therapy? (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://www.regenexx.com/2010/03/is-platelet-rich-plasma-the-same-thing-as-stem-cell-therapy 
(last visited May 11, 2011). 
148 Id. 
149 Jeff Thomas, Clinic Uses Stem Cells to Relieve Joint Pain, BOULDER COUNTY BUS. REPORT, Jan. 8, 
2010, available at http://www.bcbr.com/article.asp?id=103673. 
150 See generally REGENEXX, http://www.regenexx.com (last visited May 11, 2011). 
151 See Letter from Malarkey, supra note 22. 
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1271.10 criteria necessary to avoid obtaining a BLA or filing an IND.152  Thus, since 
these autologous ASCs qualified as heavily regulated section 351 products, it warned 
Regenerative Sciences that ―implantation of the [MSCs] for which a valid license or IND 
is not in effect appears to violate the FDCA and PHSA and may result in FDA seeking 
relief as provided by law.‖153 
Regenerative Sciences challenged the FDA‘s assertion that its MSCs were drugs 
or biological products under either statute, arguing that the Regenexx Procedure 
constituted the practice of medicine; therefore, the agency could not regulate it.154  The 
FDA, in turn, sought permanently to enjoin Regenerative Sciences from using adult 
stem cells to treat patients, claiming that the mesenchymal ASCs are at least one, if not 
more, of the following: (1) a drug; (2) a new drug; (3) a biological product; (4) a section 
351 HCT/P; (5) adulterated; or (6) misbranded.155  In response, Regenerative Sciences 
insists that the FDA has no jurisdiction to regulate the practice of medicine and that 
even if it can regulate, it acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it bypassed notice and 
comment rulemaking through its 2006 changes to the redefinition and re-categorization 
of autologous ASCs from a section 361 HCT/p to the more zealously regulated section 
351 product.156  Obviously, this case involves layers of complexity since it turns on a 
multifaceted regulatory scheme designed to enforce not one, but two intricate statutes 
against physicians using a  complicated and emerging technology. 
a. The Regenexx Procedure as a Drug 
The FDA‘s most basic argument is that the Regenexx Procedure is a ―drug‖ 
within the meaning of the FDCA; implicitly, the FDA contends that the Regenexx 
Procedure‘s use of autologous stem cells no longer entitles it to less oversight, 
particularly where the product‘s ―labeling and promotional literature, including 
                                                          
152 See Letter from Malarkey, supra note 22. 
153 See Letter from Malarkey, supra note 22. 
154 Davis, supra note 33. 
155 See Complaint at 1, United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-
01327 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010). 
156 Id.; see discussion infra Part III.A.  In 2005, 21 C.F.R. section 1271 went into effect and defined 
HTC/Ps as ―articles containing or consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for 
implantation, transportation, infusion, or transfer into a human recipient.‖  21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d).  
Regenerative Sciences argues that this is a new definition of human cells, tissues, or cellular and 
tissue based products and that the public was not afforded public notice and the opportunity to 
comment.  Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-000411, 2010 WL 1258010, at *1 
(D. Colo. 2010) (dismissing complaint on other grounds); see also supra text pp. 254-56 (identifying 
the word change). 
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information contained on Regenerative Sciences‘ website, establish that their cultured 
cell product is intended to be used in the cure, mitigation, and treatment of diseases in 
man and to affect the structure and function of the body.‖157  Specific examples of the 
marketing, or ―labeling and promotional literature‖ include the website‘s representations 
that the Regenexx Procedure ―prevents the need for surgery,‖ ―is an Alternative to 
Traditional Surgery,‖ and is ―shown to be safer than traditional surgery techniques . . . 
.‖158 
The FDA then argues that the Regenexx Procedure constitutes a prescription 
drug because, ―due to its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method 
of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, it is not safe for use except 
under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug.‖159  
Although Dr. Centeno has authored publications about the procedure, the FDA claims 
that no adequate and well-controlled studies have been conducted to demonstrate that 
the Regenexx Procedure is safe or effective for orthopedic or other uses.160  The agency 
has also characterized Regenerative Sciences‘ product as a ―new drug‖ because experts 
with scientific training and experience do not generally recognize it as safe and effective 
for use under each of the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in its 
labeling.161  As a result, the FDA claims that Regenerative Sciences was legally obligated 
to file a NDA or an IND for the Regenexx Procedure when developing this new drug, 
but Regenerative Sciences failed to fulfill this requirement.162 
b. The Regenexx Procedure as a Biological Product 
According to the FDA, the Regenexx Procedure also satisfies the PHSA‘s 
definition of a ―biological product,‖ which includes a ―virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, 
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein 
(except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product . . . applicable to 
the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.‖163  The 
agency reasons that the Regenexx Procedure is an ―analogous product that is applicable 
                                                          
157 Complaint at 6, United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C. No. 1:10-CV-
01327-RMC (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010); see also supra text p. 255 (discussing distinction between 
autologous and allogenic stem cell use). 
158 Complaint at 6, United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C, No. 1:10-CV-
01327-RMC (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010). 
159 Id. at 7. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 7-8. 
163 Id. at 8 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)). 
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to the treatment or cure of various diseases and conditions of human beings, since it is 
used to treat, inter alia, osteoarthritis, avascular necrosis of the shoulder and hip, chronic 
bursitis, non-healing bone fractures, and chronic bulging lumbar discs.‖164  
Consequently, Regenerative Sciences needed to file a BLA as required for biological 
products under the PHSA, but it never did so.165 
c. The Regenexx Procedure as a 351 Product Needing  Pre-Market Review 
The agency insists that the Regenexx Procedure does not qualify as a section 
361 product that is exempt from pre-market review; as a result, it should have 
undergone section 351-required pre-market review.  Moreover, it should have met all of 
the filing requirements for INDs, NDAs, and BLAs.166  A section 361 HCT/P cannot 
undergo more than minimal manipulation or be processed in a way that alters the 
relevant biological characteristics of the cells.167  The Regenexx Procedure, in the FDA‘s 
opinion, ―involves many steps, including selective culture and expansion of a multitude 
of different types of blood-forming and rare bone marrow stromal cells using plastic 
flasks, additives and nutrients, and environmental conditions such as temperature and 
humidity, to determine the growth and biological characteristics of the resulting cell 
population.‖168  The FDA has thus concluded that the Regenexx Procedure involves 
more than minimal manipulation and is therefore subject to the more stringent section 
351 regulations.169 
d. The Regenexx Procedure as an Adulterated Drug 
In support of its adulterated product argument, the FDA argues that the FDCA 
deems a drug to be adulterated if the methods used in, or the facilities or controls used 
for its manufacture, processing, packing, or holding, employ cGMPs or satisfy quality 
and purity standards.170  The FDA inspected Regenerative Sciences‘ facilities on two 
                                                          
164 Complaint at 7, United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-
01327-RMC (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010). 
165 See id.  ―There has not been, nor has there ever been, an approved biologics license application 
. . . filed with F.D.A. pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [section] 262 for [Regenerative Science‘s] cultured cell 
product.‖  Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 9-10.  ―An HCT/P is regulated solely under section 361 of the PHS Act and the 
regulations in this part if it . . . is minimally manipulated.‖  21 C.F.R. § 1271.10 (2010). 
168 Complaint at 10, United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-
01327-RMC (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 10-11 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)). 
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separate occasions in 2009 and alleged various violations of cGMPs.  These allegations 
included: ―failure to establish scientifically sound and appropriate specifications, 
standards, sampling plans, and test procedures designed to assure that drug products 
conform to appropriate standards of identity, strength, quality, and purity;‖ ―failure to 
establish and follow appropriate written procedures designed to prevent microbiological 
contamination of drug products purporting to be sterile;‖ and ―failure to establish an 
adequate system for monitoring environmental conditions during product 
manufacturing.‖171 
e. The Regenexx Procedure as a Misbranded Drug 
Finally, the FDA alleges that the Regenexx Procedure employs misbranding172 
because placing patients‘ cultivated adult stem cells in a plastic bag ―labeled only with the 
patient‘s name, date of birth, laboratory notebook number, cell passage number, day in 
culture, cell number, number of cells cryopreserved, and condition of cell suspension‖ 
renders the cells a drug with labeling that fails to bear adequate directions for use.173  
The agency further contends that because this is a prescription drug product, the label 
improperly failed to denote it as a ―Rx only‖ product.174 
III. Analysis 
A. A Court’s Likely Holding 
If the FDA fails to persuade a court that the Regenexx Procedure meets the 
FDCA‘s technical definition of a drug, its argument that it is a prescription drug, a new 
drug, and/or a misbranded or adulterated drug will also fail.  Regarding the FDA‘s drug 
arguments, as well as its assertion that the mesenchymal ASCs are not minimally 
manipulated section 361 HCT/Ps and therefore must be more aggressively regulated 
under section 351 of the PHSA, much will turn on whether the agency has jurisdiction 
to act, and if so, whether its regulations and enforcement decisions were arbitrary and 
capricious.  To date, Regenerative Sciences has primarily argued that the FDA 
impermissibly exceeded its authority by regulating the practice of medicine.  However, as 
explained below, Regenerative Sciences‘ strongest argument concerns the FDA‘s 
decision to forego notice and comment procedures when it expanded the scope of tier 
                                                          
171 Id. at 11-12. 
172 Id. at 13. 
173 Id. at 13-14. 
174 United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-01327-RMC, at 3 (D. 
D.C. Aug. 6, 2010). 
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two and tier three regulated HCT/Ps beyond their former focus on allogenic ASCs (i.e. 
from a different patient) to include a patient‘s own, lower-risk autologous ASCs that had 
previously qualified for tier one‘s no oversight, or at most, tier two‘s minimal section 361 
oversight.175 
1. Whether the FDA has Jurisdiction to Regulate 
The FDA‘s jurisdiction to designate and regulate the Regenexx Procedure‘s 
MSCs as a drug is likely to be upheld based on the procedure‘s a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.176  The Regenerative Sciences website advertises its procedure in a 
manner that attracts both in and out-of-state patients, with patients regularly crossing 
state lines to receive treatment.177  According to Dr. Christopher Centeno, the Medical 
Director and Chief Executive Officer of Regenerative Sciences, some seventy percent of 
Regenerative Sciences‘ patients ―fly in‖ for treatment, indicating a sufficient engagement 
in interstate commerce to satisfy Commerce Clause requirements.178 
Moreover, any obstacle to FDA intrusion on the typically state-regulated 
practice of medicine is somewhat diminished in this case since, although two practicing 
physicians own and operate Regenerative Sciences, some of its features distinguish it 
from a conventional physician practice.  Operating a separate laboratory with a non-
physician director allows the FDA to argue that the entity‘s primary objective is 
manufacturing not unlike the activities of commercial pharmaceutical companies.179  
Given Regenerative Science‘s interstate clientele and the substantial effect of its activities 
on interstate commerce, a court will recognize the FDA‘s basic jurisdiction to regulate as 
a valid exercise of its Commerce Clause power.180 
                                                          
175 See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (comparing language used in the 2001 and 
2006 regulations). 
176 See United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 267-72 (3d Cir. 2002) (laying out four criteria for 
determining whether statute falls within purview of Commerce clause as related to health care 
theft); see also Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593 (D. Me. 1995) (recognizing Congress‘ 
authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause in dentistry even if particular activity is 
intrastate, provided that class of actors‘ aggregate activity substantially affect commerce). 
177 See REGENEXX, About the Regenexx Procedure, http://www.regenexx.com/about-regenexx (last 
visited May 11, 2011). 
178 See Thomas, supra note 149 (referencing direct statements from Dr. Centeno reporting 
significant out-of-state patients). 
179 See Letter from Malarkey, supra note 22, at 1 (stating drawn bone marrow sent to separate 
laboratory for appropriate cultivation). 
180 See United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 267-72 (3d Cir. 2002); Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. 
Supp. 580, 593 (D.Me. 1995). 
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2. Whether the FDA Can Regulate Adult Stem Cells as “Drugs” and/or “Biologics” 
In terms of the FDA‘s power to define and regulate drugs and biologics, it can 
expect substantial judicial deference to its interpretation and enforcement of its enabling 
statutes.  When evaluating an administrative agency‘s construction of a statute that it 
administers, the reviewing court must initially determine whether Congress specifically 
addressed the issue; if not, the court ―must respect the agency‘s construction . . . so long 
as it is permissible.‖181  Substantial deference is owed to the agency since it is more 
familiar with the issue or area being regulated, and the agency is better able to choose 
among competing policy objectives.182  Accordingly, the FDA is likely to prevail in its 
determination that the ASCs produced by the Regenexx Procedure qualify as a drug 
under the FDCA.  The FDA‘s decision that the product also qualifies as a biological 
product under the PHSA will also likely be upheld, although Regenerative Sciences has a 
somewhat stronger argument that the agency had no grounds to classify the end-product 
of the Regenexx Procedure as a heavily regulated section 351 product, given its 
autologous use.183 
A court will likely find that the Regenexx Procedure‘s ASCs constitute a drug 
under section 201(g) of the FDCA because the procedure and the resulting product fit 
the plain language of the statute: i.e., it is a procedure that is ―intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of diseases in man and to affect the 
structure or any function of the body.‖184  At a minimum, a court will defer to the 
FDA‘s determination given its particular competence to evaluate intended use, which 
                                                          
181 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (citing Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
182 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132. 
183 See United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 798-801 (1969) 
(finding by the Supreme Court that the definition of ―drug‖ under 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1) should 
be interpreted liberally); see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2009) (defining ―drugs‖ under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act); Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, § 351, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (1944) 
(codified as amended under 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2010)).  The statute defines a ―biological 
product‖ as a ―virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide) or 
analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic 
arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of disease or condition of 
human beings.‖  See Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, § 351, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (codified as 
amended under 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1)).  The FDA defines an HCT/P as ―articles containing or 
consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, 
or transfer into a human recipient.‖  See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d) (2007). 
184 See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 20, 52 Stat. 1041 (1938) (codified as amended 
under 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(2009)). 
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depends on the ―objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of 
drugs‖ and may be shown by ―labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written 
statements by such persons or their representatives.‖185  Regenerative Sciences‘ website 
evinces its intent that the Regenexx Procedure affects the structure or functions of the 
body186 as a viable alternative to surgery for patients suffering from non-healing bone 
fractures, osteoarthritis or other injuries of the knee, hip, ankle, shoulder, and hands, 
chronic bulging lumbar disc or herniated lumbar disc, avascular necrosis of the hip, and 
chronic bursitis.187  Patient testimonials on the website also report functional 
improvement after undergoing the Regenexx Procedure, underscoring that Regenerative 
Sciences intends the treatment to affect the structure or function of the body.188 
That the ―drugs‖ at issue in the Regenerative Sciences case are human cells 
rather than traditional pharmaceuticals does not alter this result.189  In addition to a 
court‘s typical deference to an agency‘s construction of its statute,190 the United States 
Supreme Court in Bacto-Unidisk emphasized that the FDCA should be broadly 
interpreted and applied since ―Congress intended to define ‗drug‘ far more broadly than 
[did] the medical profession . . . ‗drug‘ is a term of art for the purposes of the [FDCA], 
encompassing far more than the strict medical definition of that word.‖191  Regenerative 
Sciences, nevertheless, argues autologous stem cells cannot be regulated as drugs 
because they ―are not property of the biotech industry‖ and ―nobody invented 
autologous stem cells . . . .‖192  This might have some appeal if the term ―drug‖ was 
                                                          
185 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2010) (explaining the meaning of ―intended uses‖). 
186 See REGENEXX, Conditions Treated, http://www.regenexx.com/the-regenexx-procedures (last 
visited May 11, 2011). 
187 See id. 
188 See REGENEXX, Archive for the „Patient Testimonials‟ Category, http://www.regenexx.com/ 
category/patient-testimonials (last visited May 11, 2011). 
189 See REGENEXX, Procedure Explained, http://www.regenexx.com/the-regenexx-procedure-
explained (last visited May 11, 2011).  The website explains that a doctor takes samples of bone 
marrow and blood, which are sent to the lab where the cells are processed and then re-injected in 
the area in need of repair.  Id. 
190 See United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 791-92 (1969) 
(stating judicial deference to Secretary‘s decision where regulations are deemed appropriate for 
public health and such regulations are consistent with the Act). 
191 Id. at 793.  The Court ruled that in light of the structure, legislative history, and remedial 
nature of the FDCA, it was clear that Congress intended a broad, sweeping, definition of ‗drug.‘  
Id. at 798. 
192 Christopher J. Centeno, Our Patients' Autologous Stem Cells Are Drugs: The FDA Moving 
Down a Dangerous Slippery Slope, Address at the Clinical Applications for Age Management 
Medicine Conference (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://fapmmed.net/FAPM%20Centeno% 
20Editorial%20on%20Public%20Health%20Impacts%20of%20FDA%20Regulting%20Practice
%20of%20Medicine.pdf. 
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being used in its colloquial sense, but as the Court explained in Bacto-Unidisk, the FDCA 
employs a technical definition based on an article‘s intended use, not its inherent 
properties.193   
3.  Whether the FDA Can Regulate Autologous Adult Stem Cell Therapies under Section 
351  
Whether the Regenexx procedure is properly categorized as a section 351 
HCT/P is less clear, although it is likely that judicial deference to agency action will 
result in upholding this claim, too.  As explained supra, section 351 of the PHSA defines 
a ―biological product‖ to include any ―virus, therapeutic serum, . . . or analogous 
product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of 
human beings.‖194  The FDA views the mesenchymal ASCs produced through the 
Regenexx Procedure as a section 351 ―analogous product,‖ though the courts have yet 
to define that term.195  Regenerative Sciences‘ website suggests that these ASCs do 
indeed apply to the prevention, treatment, or cure of disease as required by the statute.  
Specifically, the ASC procedure is touted as an alternative to surgery for the treatment of 
osteoarthritis, avascular necrosis, and chronic bulging lumbar disks.196  Further, the 
Regenexx process multiplies cells by culturing them in a laboratory for as long as two 
weeks while exposing them to a variety of compounds and techniques.  The FDA 
therefore has a strong argument that these cells are subject to extensive regulation under 
section 351 since the cells are ―highly processed, are used for other than their normal 
function, are combined with non-tissue components, or are used for metabolic purposes 
. . . .‖197 
In its pleadings, the FDA insists that its three-tiered, risk based framework is 
designed to ―‗provide only the degree of government oversight necessary to protect the 
public health‘ [and] ‗ensure that innovation and product development in this rapidly 
growing medical field could proceed unhindered by unnecessary regulation.‘‖198  The 
                                                          
193 Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . , 394 U.S. at 798-99 (proclaiming ‗drug‘ should not be 
deemed as a device nor held to its strict medical definition). 
194 Public Health Service Act § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2010). 
195 See United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-01327-RMC, at *8 
(D. D.C. Aug. 6, 2010). 
196 Public Health Service Act § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 261(i)(1). 
197 Halme & Kessler, supra note 19, at 1730 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(1-4)). 
198 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 
6-7, available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/I%2019%20Plaintiff's%20Motion%20for%20 
Summary%20Judgment%20010711.pdf (citing Proposed Approach at 6); see also Proposed 
Registration Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 26745; Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-
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FDA has defined the process of culturing stem cells to expand their number and/or 
facilitate differentiation as involving more than minimal manipulation and therefore, 
involving more risk than should be regulated accordingly.199  For instance, the process of 
cultivation could potentially use non-human fetal calf serum, which the FDA has 
indicated could contain prion, a protein particle that is believed to cause degenerative 
diseases of the central nervous system, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy or 
―mad cow‖ disease.200  Additionally, the self-renewing ability of stem cells that makes 
them so promising for use in regenerative therapies could also trigger uncontrolled cell 
growth and produce tumors.201  Indeed, Regenerative Sciences has acknowledged on its 
website that the long-term effects of products like Regenexx-SD have not yet been 
scientifically proven.202  Although ASC therapies can only be obtained by seeing the 
physician who will perform the procedure, and thus do not fit the mass manufacturing 
and marketing model of major pharmaceuticals, health risks remain.203  Consequently, a 
court will likely hold that the FDA is authorized to regulate the Regenexx Procedure as a 
section 351 product.204 
In its Answer and Counterclaims, Regenerative Sciences argues that judicial 
deference would be improper here since Congress never authorized the FDA to regulate 
the use of HCT/Ps for all autologous uses where doing so creates an unwarranted 
intrusion on the state-regulated practice of medicine.205  As explained in its initial suit 
against the FDA and currently asserted as an affirmative defense, Regenerative Sciences 
maintains that instead of exercising its section 351 power to prevent the spread of 
communicable diseases from human tissue donors to human tissue recipients, the FDA 
is now attempting to regulate all human tissue by categorizing both autologous and 
allogenic ASC therapies as section 351 products that cannot be used without filing an 
                                                          
Based Products, FDA Dkt. No. 97N-0068 (Feb. 28, 1997) at 7; Proposed Approach to 
Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Availability and Public Meeting, 62 Fed. Reg. 
9721 (Mar. 4, 1997). 
199 See United States Dep‘t of Justice v. Regenerative Sci., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-01327-RMC, at 
*10 (D. D.C. Aug. 6, 2010).  See generally supra note 198. 
200 Halme & Kessler, supra note 19, at 1732. 
201 Halme & Kessler, supra note 19, at 1734. 
202 See REGENEXX, Regenexx-SD Orthopedic Stem Cell Injection Results, http://www.regenexx.com/ 
2010/12/regenexx-sd-orthopedic-stem-cell-injection-results/ (last visited May 11, 2011) (noting 
the findings presented were for ―outcome data to date (all that we were able to obtain)‖). 
203 See Halme & Kessler, supra note 19, at 1732, 1734. 
204 See generally Plaintiff‘s Motion, Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 09-
CV-00411-WYD-BNB (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2010). 
205 Answer at 47-49, Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug. Admin, No. 1:10-CV-01327 
(D. D.C. Aug. 27, 2010), available at http://www.rockysfight.com/files/Centeno_20Answer 
_1_.pdf. 
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IND, NDA, and BLA.206  Regenerative Sciences contends that the FDA‘s attempted 
regulatory change is problematic for two reasons.  First, erasing the prior regulatory 
distinction between autologous and allogenic ASC treatments now subjects individual 
and small physician practices to the same expansive and cumbersome compliance 
requirements governing large commercial firms that manufacture drugs and biologics for 
release to the general public.207  Second, the agency accomplished this dramatic change 
through a subtle, one word change (i.e., replacing ―another human‖ with ―a human‖) in 
2005 without notice and comment rule making.208  The FDA justifies this as an 
                                                          
206 Id. at 9-10; see also Plaintiff‘s Motion, Regenerative Sci. Inc., No. 09-CV-00411-WYD-BNB, at *3-
4.  In denying Regenerative‘s request for injunctive relief on grounds that the FDA‘s action was 
ultra vires, the judge held that Regenerative had not presented sufficient evidence regarding its 
likelihood of success on the merits.  See id.  He reasoned: 
[A]s a result of the posture of this litigation, such a task would be unduly 
complex and speculative.  The Court would have to assess the likelihood of 
the transmission of a wide range of diseases, under diverse methods for 
processing numerous types of HCT/Ps with various autologous uses, to 
determine at this stage whether FDA's regulation defining HCT/Ps, 21 C.F.R. 
[section] 1271.3(d), is ―ultra vires‖ in all possible circumstances. 
Id.  It should be noted, however, that a denial of injunctive relief is not necessarily indicative of 
the eventual outcome of the case.  Id.  It is therefore possible that the district court, after full 
evidentiary hearings and a trial on the merits, will agree with Regenerative.  Id. at *8; see also 
Complaint, Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug. Admin, No. 1:10-CV-01327-RMC (Aug. 
6, 2010) (noting the FDA‘s assertion that ―products that are more than minimally manipulated 
are regulated . . . as biological products under section 351 of the PHSA‖). 
207 See Plaintiff‘s Motion, Regenerative Sci. Inc., No. 09-CV-00411-WYD-BNB, at *1, *7-8 
(describing small size of Regenerative‘s staff and medical practice, then subsequently and 
separately outlining Regenerative‘s hardship argument, focusing upon the detriment Regenerative 
asserts the regulation will have on its medical practice). 
208 See supra text pp. 255-56 (identifying word change).  But see 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5467 (Jan. 19, 
2001) (final rule codified at 21 C.F.R. section 1271.3(d) reflecting the relevant parts of the final 
rule as originally codified).  See also 66 Fed. Reg. at 5450 (articulating the reasoning for division of 
the definition of HCT/Ps in the final rule into two sub-parts, the purpose of which was to 
―stagger[] the effective dates of the registration and listing regulation for different types of 
HCT/Ps‖).  In accordance with this goal, the final rule, as originally codified at 21 C.F.R. section 
1271.3, included separate paragraphs codified at sections 1271.3(d)(1) and 1271.3(d)(2) 
respectively.  See 66 Fed. Reg. at 5467.  Paragraph (d)(1) of section 1271.3, as originally codified, 
composed the HCT/P subgroup whose registration and listing regulation were to go into effect 
first, while paragraph (d)(2) of 1271.3, as originally codified, included the HCTPs covered by 
(d)(1), as well as many additional types of HCT/Ps.  Id.  This intent to stagger is further 
evidenced by the language of the final rule stating that its provisions ―[are] effective April 4, 2001, 
except for . . . [section] 1271.3(d)(2), which [is] to be effective on January 31, 2003.‖  66 Fed. Reg. 
at 5447.  Delays in the rule making process pushed past this initial effective date for section 
1271.3(d)(2), making necessary the further delay of  section1271.3(d)(2)‘s effective date to January 
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interpretive rule that simply clarifies existing regulations and is therefore exempt from 
notice and comment procedures as a procedural (as opposed to a substantive) change.209 
However, arguing that this word change as merely clarifying and therefore 
procedural is questionable at best, if not overtly specious. The significant and 
substantive impact of this change on who and what are subject to zealous section 351 
oversight is undeniable, particularly in the case of physicians who typically have the 
ability to innovate new therapeutic applications but lack the resources to meet 
compliance obligations that were designed with large pharmaceutical manufacturers in 
mind.210  As explained in the oft-quoted case of Jem Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,211 the 
―‗critical feature‘ of the procedural exception [to notice and comment requirements] ‗is 
that it covers agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties 
. . . .‘‖212  By dropping the role of ―transplantation into another human‖ from its 
definition of HCT/Ps, the FDA plainly altered how autologous cell therapies would be 
categorized and regulated by its three-tiered framework and thus, inevitably changed 
―the rights and interests‖ of physicians using autologous stem cells.  Such a marked 
change in ―substantive outcomes‖ for stem cell practitioners should prompt the court to 
reject the agency‘s procedural characterization of the rule and invalidate it as a 
substantive rule improperly enacted without notice and comment.‖213 
Moreover, the FDA will need to focus on more than minimal manipulation to 
                                                          
21, 2004.  See 68 Fed. Reg. at 2690.  The FDA asserts that, ―when all of Part 1271‘s 
comprehensive framework was in place, the subdivision in the HCT/P definition became 
superfluous, so (d)(1) was revoked and (d)(2) was renumbered as a conforming amendment.‖  
Defendants‘ Reply to Plaintiff‘s Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 2009 WL 2956107 (D. 
Colo. May 26, 2009) (No. 109-CV-00411); see also 69 Fed. Reg. at 68,614 (amending paragraph 
(d)(1) of section 1271.3, as already discussed in this footnote, this amendment had effective date 
of May 25, 2005). 
209 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (exemptions to notice and 
comment requirements); Defendants‘ Reply to Plaintiff‘s Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to 
Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Regenerative Sci., Inc., 2009 WL 2956107 (No. 
109-CV-00411); Regenerative Sci., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 09-CV-00411-WYD-
BNB (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2010). 
210 The FDA‘s aggressive legal maneuverings against Centeno et al. are likely to chill physicians 
from working in the regenerative sciences field.  See Letter from Malarkey, supra note 22.  At a 
minimum, the FDA needs to clarify how it will treat such therapies, to avoid a lack of research 
and development in the field. 
211 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
212 Id. at 326 (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
213 See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text. 
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justify its oversight of autologous ASCs since large concentrations of ASCs can be 
harvested from adipose tissue and used during the same procedure, obviating the need 
to expand their number during days, if not weeks, of laboratory culture.214  At a 
minimum, the FDA needs to clarify how it will treat such therapies since its aggressive 
legal maneuverings against Regenerative Sciences is more than likely to chill physicians 
from working in this area.  This result would undercut the FDA‘s mission to advance 
the public health by fostering innovation. 
B. A Better Approach to Regulating Large and Small Drug 
“Manufacturers” 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the FDA‘s defense of its re-categorization 
of autologous therapies, judicial deference to administrative action is likely to result in at 
least a partial victory for the FDA in its efforts to hold Regenerative Sciences to the 
same drug pre-marketing and biologics licensing requirements that bind large firms. 
However, while this may be legally permissible, it is not necessarily legally wise.  Rather, 
imposing a regulatory scheme designed for mass drug manufacturers on small physician 
practices is problematic in terms of fostering innovation, respecting an individual 
patient‘s bodily autonomy, and advancing important public health objectives.215 
That physicians literally cannot afford to comply with the FDA‘s pre-marketing 
approval requirements is unquestioned.216  In 2003, a trio of economists estimated that 
                                                          
214 See, e.g., Jeanne Adiwinata Pawitan, Prospect of Adipose Tissue Derived Mesenchymal Stem Cells in 
Regenerative Medicine, 2 CELL & TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION & THERAPY 7, 8 (2009).  Pawitan 
states: 
[C]ompared to bone marrow [the most common source of ASCs], adipose 
tissue can be obtained in larger volumes, at lower risks, less painful, and easier 
to get as it is the waste product of liposuction.  Moreover, in bone . . . the 
number [of ASCs] is declining with age . . . . Therefore, adipose tissue will be 
the preferred source of MSCs for future clinical use. 
Id. 
215 See Jeff Morris & L. Stephen Coles, Will the FDA Kill Adult Stem Cell Medicine, H+ MAGAZINE, 
May 1, 2009, available at http://www.hplusmagazine.com/articles/bio/will-fda-kill-adult-stem-
cell-medicine.  Such a regulatory scheme would eventually result in large pharmaceutical 
companies controlling all of the Regenerative Sciences.  Id.  This would stunt innovation as 
pharmaceutical companies are bound by the many restrictions of the FDA and other federal 
agencies.  Id. 
216 See Roger Collier, Drug Development Cost Estimates Hard to Swallow, 180 CAN. MED. ASS‘N J. 279, 
279 (2009).  With physicians essentially ―priced-out‖ of the FDA pre-marketing requirements, 
there is a fear that innovation will be hampered.  See id.  Pharmaceutical companies say that the 
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pharmaceutical companies spent $802,000,000, on average, to bring a new drug into the 
market.217  This considerable expenditure, as well as the time required to conduct three 
phases of clinical trials, will essentially bar smaller entities from market entry and will 
allow the market to be entirely controlled by large pharmaceutical companies.218  In 
addition, imposing the stringent section 351 regulatory requirements on physicians will 
prevent individual patients from receiving much-needed new or improved therapies.219  
Insofar as such innovative treatments will not reach the general public, such aggressive 
oversight also undermines the FDA‘s core mission of ―advancing the public health by 
helping to speed innovations.‖  This is especially worrisome here since large profit-
driven pharmaceutical companies (owing fiduciary duties to shareholders, in contrast to 
a physician‘s duty to patients) will emerge with even more market power than they 
already have.220 
Consequently, the FDA should continue to refine its underlying objective in 
designing its current three-tiered structure for regulating HCT/Ps.  Physicians must be 
able to innovate when practicing medicine.  Further, a more flexible approach to 
regulatory oversight will better accommodate the demand for more and better therapies 
with the need to protect individual patients and the public health from disease 
transmission and product contamination.221 
                                                          
high cost of clinical trials in particular is the driving force behind such high pre-marketing 
requirements.  Id. 
217 See id.; see also Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development 
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (explaining the reasons for the high costs of drug 
development).  The lead author of the study that produced this estimate is Joseph DiMasi, 
director of economic analysis at the Tufts Center of Drug Development in Boston, 
Massachusetts.  Collier, supra note 216, at 279.  Since the publication of DiMasi‘s article in 2003, 
other economists have estimated the current cost of drug development as exceeding DiMasi‘s 
estimates and reaching upwards of $1.3 billion.  Id.  However, these estimates have been called 
into question by those who are skeptical of pharmaceutical industry-supported economists.  
Donald Light et al., Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 1034, 
1035 (2005).  Such skeptics accuse the industry of inflating the high cost of drug development to 
justify the high market price of the drugs.  Id. 
218 See Collier, supra note 216, at 279 (describing what goes into the high cost of drug 
development).  Compounding this issue is the fact that the complexity of clinical trials is on a 
rising trend, which will only further increase the drug development cost.  Id.  While it is known 
that clinical trials are becoming more complex, it is difficult to estimate how that increased 
complexity will be translated into the future costs of research and development.  Id. 
219 See generally DiMasi et al., supra note 217. 
220 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MISSION STATEMENT (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm (last visited May 11, 2011). 
221 See supra notes 109-122.  The FDA has set up specific criteria that a product must meet to 
qualify as an HCT/P.  21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a) (2010). 
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With regard to the latter two interests, the FDA must remember that even the 
conventional practice of medicine routinely poses significant risks of disease 
transmission and contamination.  The absence of hand washing, for instance, can 
transmit infection from one patient to another, as can a failure to sterilize instruments 
between procedures.  However, the FDA is not the contamination police, and therefore, 
the FDA has no power to intervene in such situations.  Rather, practice guidelines, state 
licensing requirements and duties of care, and other state oversight mechanisms can and 
should monitor how medicine is practiced.222  Moreover, the FDA must recognize that 
physicians and surgeons have always played a leading role in medical innovation.  For 
instance, numerous minimally invasive procedures that have become routine in modern 
cardiology began with one surgeon‘s determination to find less traumatic alternatives to 
vascular surgery.223  A similar story can be told for coronary artery bypass surgery, a 
procedure which now saves hundreds of thousands of lives each year.224  The overall 
specialty of plastic surgery owes a debt to World War I surgeons whose creative 
strategies for reconstructing battlefield wounds laid the groundwork for current 
practice.225 
From a strictly legal standpoint, perhaps the FDA can move aggressively against 
physicians using emerging ASC therapies.  Yet, in determining how it should proceed, it 
would do well to return to treating autologous and allogenic procedures differently.  
Alternatively, it should look to the European Commission‘s strategy for permitting small 
medical groups to produce innovative therapies involving drugs or biologics while 
                                                          
222 See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review 
and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care 
Organizations, 8 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 201, 201-02 (1999) (describing the power of states to 
regulate health care practices). 
223 Thomas J. Fogarty, Inventor of the Week, LEMELSON M.I.T. PROGRAM, 
http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/fogarty.html (last visited May 11, 2011).  Dr. Fogarty built the 
prototype for the Foley Balloon Embolectomy Catheter in his home attic by ―attaching the 
fingertip of a latex surgical glove to a catheter using fly-tying techniques familiar to him from 
boyhood fishing expeditions.‖  Id. 
224 Valentin Fuster & James T. Willerson, In Memoriam, Rene G. Favaloro, MD, The Passing of a 
Pioneer, AM. HEART ASS'N, http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/full/103/4/480 (last visited 
May 11, 2011).  In the late 1960‘s, Rene G. Favolaro, M.D. and his fellow cardiothoracic surgeons 
at the Cleveland Clinic revolutionized heart surgery by using the saphenous vein from the leg to 
re-route blood flow to bypass obstructed coronary arteries.  Id. 
225 See THE AM. ACAD. OF FACIAL PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY, 
http://www.aafprs.org/patient/about_us/h_war.html (last visited May 11, 2011).  ―They 
improvised and collaborated to meet each horrific need as it arose, inventing on the spot many of 
the procedures that comprise the repertoire of the modern facial plastic surgeon.‖  Id. 
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simultaneously promoting safety and effectiveness.226  The European Commission‘s 
―Advanced Therapies‖ regulations, adopted in 2008 and applicable to gene therapy, 
somatic cell therapy, and tissue-engineered products, demonstrate a better way to 
regulate both large and small drug manufacturers.227  The regulations employ: (a) a 
centralized marketing authorization procedure; (b) a multidisciplinary committee to 
advise as to whether a product qualifies as an advanced therapy and to address other 
scientific concerns; and (c) special incentives for small and medium enterprises 
(―SMEs‖) to foster their success.228 
The European Commission recognizes that SMEs in the biopharmaceutical 
sector deserve particular attention if patients and society are to reap the benefits of 
public health advances these companies may achieve.229  Accordingly, it seeks to create a 
regulatory environment that enables European Union authorities to provide financial 
support to SMEs.230  In this regard, the European Commission has recognized that ―the 
main financial and administrative entry hurdles for SMEs are the various steps involved 
in pre-marketing authorization procedures . . . such as the seeking of the marketing 
authorization application . . . .‖231  As such, its regulations offer SMEs a ninety percent 
reduction on fees related to scientific advice, inspections, and other scientific services, 
and the regulations defer marketing authorization application fees until the end of the 
evaluation procedure.232  Further, it has established an SME office to provide 
administrative assistance, facilitate communication between SMEs and the government, 
and address inquiries.233 
The untenable costs and obstacles that the FDA‘s current approach poses to 
regulating cellular medical innovations by practicing physicians directly contravene the 
agency‘s obligation to foster innovation for the public health.234  Consequently, because 
                                                          
226 See Commission Regulation 1394/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 324) 121. 
227 Id. at 121. 
228 Id. at 122-28. 
229 Commission Regulation 2049/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 329) 4.  ―Such provisions should . . . aim at 
promoting innovation and the development of new medicinal products by SMEs.‖  Id. at 4. 
230 Id.  ―In order to reduce the cost for SMEs of marketing medicinal products authorized via the 
centrali[z]ed procedure, that Regulation therefore foresees the adoption of specific provisions 
allowing a reduction of fees, deferring the payment of fees, and providing administrative 
assistance.‖  Id. 
231 Commission Regulation 2049/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 329) 4, 4. 
232 Id. at 5-6. 
233 Id. at 6-7. 
234 See generally supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text (discussing the challenge of cost faced 
by smaller medical groups). 
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therapeutic applications for adult stem cells are progressing at a rapid pace,235 retooling 
the agency‘s current HCT/P regulatory framework is nothing short of a public health 
imperative.  The European Commission‘s support for innovation is one approach, but it 
does rely heavily on providing financial incentives, something that the FDA is unlikely 
to match given current economic constraints.  Therefore, returning to its bifurcated 
treatment of autologous and allogenic ASC therapies, especially when developed and/or 
used by practicing physicians (as opposed to commercial manufacturers) may be the 
more feasible approach. 
IV. Conclusion 
While the FDA lacks jurisdiction specifically to regulate the practice of 
medicine, its broad Commerce Clause power allows it to affect the activities of 
individual health care providers.  Courts traditionally defer to the FDA‘s determinations 
of what constitutes a drug and a biologic product under both the FDCA and the PHSA, 
and the FDA‘s suit against Regenerative Sciences promises to be no different.  
Consequently, the FDA‘s assertion of jurisdiction over physicians who are using and, 
therefore, ―manufacturing‖ these products is likely to stand.  Less certain is whether the 
agency can act through de facto substantive rule changes that circumvented notice and 
comment requirements. 
Whatever happens in the Regenerative Sciences case, the FDA should recognize 
that it makes little sense to impose a regulatory framework developed for mass 
manufacturers on small physician practices.  This is especially true where doing so 
compromises innovative therapies.  Instead, the FDA should craft a truly flexible 
regulatory regime either by refining its current three-tiered framework or following the 
lead of the European Commission.  In this way, the agency can fulfill its statutory charge 
by properly accommodating the interests of health care providers, commercial 
manufacturers, and most importantly, patients and the general public. 
 
                                                          
235 See generally supra note 217 and accompanying text (alluding to the rising complexity of clinical 
trials). 
